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Abstract
This commentary examines two principal forms of inequality and their evolution 
since the 1960s: the division of national income between capital and labour, and 
the share of total income held by the top 1 per cent of earners. Trends are linked 
to current discussions of inequality drivers such as financialisation, and a brief 
time-series analysis of the effects of trade and financial sector growth on top 
incomes is presented.
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Inequality is fast becoming the political buzzword of our time. US democrats 
have hit on inequality as the focus of their policy programme since Obama’s 
re-election, and Ed Miliband looks set to pin the 2015 electoral hopes of the 
British Labour party on an agenda of inequality reduction. Talk of inequality in 
Ireland appears closely tailored to electoral concerns, as the ‘squeezed middle’ 
(the traditional centre-right voting bloc of the dominant political parties) take 
a disproportionate share of policy and media attention, despite the disastrous 
consequences of austerity on those in lower-income groups. The Irish report of 
the international ‘Growing Inequalities’ Impacts’ (GINI) project notes strong 
links between educational attainment and household earnings, and an increase in 
inequality since the financial crisis (Calvert et al. 2013: 29), while the Economic 
and Social Research Institute’s (ESRI) ‘Growing up in Ireland’ study observed a 
decline in the reported health of children in low-income families from 2008–11 
(O’ Toole 2013). Ongoing work at the Centre for Health Geoinformatics is now 
uncovering strong class gradients in regional premature mortality rates, which 
appear closely linked to a number of material and social deprivation indicators.
Globally the balance is equally poor despite the movement of countries 
such as China into middle-income deciles (Lanker and Milanovic 2013), 
with Oxfam’s report on political capture and economic inequality stating that 
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over half the world’s wealth now resides with the richest 1 per cent (Fuentes-
Nivea and Galasso 2014). The Irish experience of the financial crisis has been 
especially harsh, with rising national and personal debt levels, one of the worst 
unemployment rates in Europe, and widespread cuts in public spending. Despite 
the clear class gradient in terms of those who have suffered worst, the Irish 
policy response has done little to equalise the pain. With enormous transfers 
of public money to private financial institutions, state-implemented internship 
schemes and privatisation of utilities, Ireland has been complicit in a substantial 
upward transfer of wealth. The International Labour Organisation (2013) has 
also drawn attention to the ‘broken link’ between wages and productivity since 
the 1980s, where rising output has not translated into higher shares of wealth for 
workers. We have every reason to believe that these processes will compound 
intergenerational inequalities, as well as inequalities between income groups, 
resulting in greater income capture for the wealthiest.
Inequality: explanations and trends
The political appropriation of inequality is certainly not without precedent – it 
has become an important part of recent political and research discussion thanks 
to publications such as Wilkinson and Pickett (2010), and more recently Thomas 
Piketty (2014a). Within core sociology, Kristal (2010, 2013) has drawn attention 
to the multiple levels at which inequality operates, from the division of Gross 
Domestic Product between capital and labour, and wage-share differentials 
across economic sectors. Others such as Jason Beckfield (2006) have identified 
key macro-level drivers of inequality such as regional economic and political 
integration which have tended to drive welfare retrenchment and undermine 
collective bargaining through international competition. Recently, Basak 
Kus (2012) has examined the damaging effect of financialisation on income 
inequality across the OECD since 1995. Together these studies reveal a number 
of consistencies: 1) that income inequality has grown substantially since the 
late 1970s, bringing many countries back to levels not recorded since the early 
twentieth century; 2) that we can identify consistent drivers of inequality that 
operate with remarkable consistency across countries; 3) that the consequences 
of rising inequality reach across multiple levels, from our physical and mental 
health, to the well-being of our communities, and the functioning of our 
democratic institutions. 
Following the attention Piketty has lately received, some have branded his 
work as the definitive proof the left has been waiting for. Indeed, for so forceful 
a critique of liberal capitalism to emerge from within economics is surely 
an indictment of the inability of neoclassicals to account for the potentially 
negative consequences of economic growth. Rhetoric is not the sole preserve 
of political elites however, and Deirdre McCloskey (1988), has been picking at 
the rhetorical underpinnings of quantitative economics for some time, claiming 
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that the business of forecasting and formal modelling relies as much on shared 
assumptions and narrative frames in its claims to scientific rigour. In any event 
– rhetoric or no – it is difficult to ignore the parsimony of Piketty’s model. By 
distilling inequality to a simple relationship between slow economic growth and 
high capital returns, he suggests that increases in wealth inequality are the norm 
(rather than the exception) of a functioning liberal market system. David Harvey 
(2014) arrives at the same diagnosis in his recent discussion of compound 
growth, suggesting that capitalism is fast approaching a point where innovation 
will no longer supply the investment returns needed to forestall crises. The 
recent finance-driven phase of deregulated capitalism surely underscores the 
danger of this situation. Unburdened by national regulation or restrictions on 
international movement, and caught in a rut of low national economic growth 
since the late 1970s, capital sought its best returns in a system of speculative 
finance, which came to a spectacular end toward the close of the last decade. 
What follows is a brief overview of how Ireland fits within these global trends, 
and how inequality has evolved in the context of key stressors in recent history.
Inequality between capital and labour
Tony Atkinson (2009) suggested that factor shares constituted the ‘principal 
problem’ of political economy, claiming we often find it difficult to connect 
what happens at the level of the macro-economy to the money in our pockets. 
The concept of ‘factor shares’ resolves this difficulty somewhat by focusing 
on the division of national income (GDP) between capital and labour, or by 
calculating the percentage of income accruing to labour in the form of wages 
(commonly referred to as ‘labour’s share’). A renewed emphasis on this classic 
division has since animated discussions of inequality, not least because of labour 
share’s curious departure from supposed laws of economic growth, which claim 
this ratio should remain stable over time. Instead the opposite has happened, and 
labour’s share has fallen almost universally in advanced capitalist democracies 
(Kristal 2010).
Figure 1 graphs Irish labour’s share of national income, or compensation 
of employees as a percentage of gross national income, adjusted for self-em-
ployment. Relative to other countries, Ireland’s decline from the 1980s to the 
mid-2000s has been quite strong, with a European Commission report (2007) 
noting Ireland’s rate of decline as the strongest of all EU member states. This 
decline is evidently not uniform across the entire series however, and Ireland 
mirrors the experience of many advanced capitalist countries who have 
experienced alternating phases of growth and loss, with particular losses since 
the late 1970s.1 Common explanations of this trend break since the 1980s 
focus on a shift in collective bargaining power, and in the United States, this 
pattern is often attributed to the collapse of the post-war capital–labour accord. 
While unionisation and welfare state growth remained strong in the post-war 
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era, the 1970s ushered in a phase of capital account liberalisation, labour 
market deregulation, and welfare retrenchment, eroding workers’ traditional 
protections.
The rise of productivity-enhancing and labour saving technologies from 
the 1970s to 1980s, according to the ‘Skill-Biased Technological Change’ 
hypothesis, supposedly introduced a strong class gradient into the labour 
market, leading to the formation of new inequalities between skilled and 
unskilled workers. Finally, as the Fordist regime gave way to new forms of 
globalised flexible production, the balance of bargaining power shifted in favour 
of mobile capital, now better able to take advantage of cheap material imports, 
outsourcing, and eventually, relocation to countries with cheap labour costs. 
Together, these processes eroded the capacity of labour to bargain against capital 
for greater returns on rising productivity, and its share of economic rewards fell. 
From the experience of the recent crisis, the prognosis for labour is therefore 
poor. With the casualisation of wage labour, widespread contractual insecurity, 
high unemployment and falling, decentralised unionisation, the ‘moral hazard’ 
introduced through the public recapitalisation of the private sector has surely 
signalled that capital has little to fear either from organised labour or the state. 
If Piketty’s prognosis is correct, and the future of capitalism is that of low 
growth coupled with high capital returns (stagnant growth rates and recent 
Figure 1 Labour’s share of national income in Ireland and the OECD, 1960–
2012
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inflation of local property prices in certain areas suggests as much), the ability 
for workers to achieve occupational and intergenerational mobility in the 
labour market is surely limited. In terms of social protection, Irish government 
consumption as a percentage of GDP dropped from 7 per cent in 1991 to 5 
per cent in 2007, while Ireland’s growing integration with European financial 
markets throughout the 1990s heightened its exposure to global economic 
instability, with almost one-third of Ireland’s liabilities residing within the 
Eurozone immediately prior to the financial crisis (Ó Riain 2012). According 
to decommodification measures computed by Scruggs and Allen, Ireland’s 
unemployment benefit replacement rates are marginally below average, as are 
its sick pay and public pensions (Scruggs and Allen 2006: 59). These weak 
social safety nets underscore the importance of growing structural powerless-
ness, and labour’s share is an important measure relating macro-economic 
processes and the collective bargaining power of workers to the formation of 
an economy-wide income pool. It must therefore be considered as a mediator 
of society-wide personal income inequalities captured through other measures, 
such as income percentile shares.
Top income shares
Figure 2 Income shares of the top 1 per cent in Ireland and the OECD, 1960–
2012 
Note: graph rescaled to illustrate both series
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Few figures underscore the uneven impact of financial capitalism as much as 
the upward trend in top-income shares. In 2003, Paul Thompson drew attention 
to a number of factors associated with top-income growth such as the de-linking 
of executive and CEO pay from underlying performance indices, and the rise 
of shareholder managerialism and equity financing whereby companies were 
run not for the welfare of their workers, but for their shareholders’ dividends 
(Kus 2012; Thompson 2003). These conditions have lately been incorporated 
by researchers as a core mechanism of ‘financialisation’, a process viewed by 
many as a primary driver of income inequality since the 1980s. Under finan-
cialisation, traditional drivers of inequality such as globalisation,2 the rise of the 
service sector, and de-unionisation have been compounded by other stressors. 
These include the stagnation of ‘blue collar’ wages as real economy activities 
such as manufacturing decline in importance, stock market profiteering, and 
the rise of neoliberal fiscal policies targeting inflation reduction instead of 
social spending (Guttman 2008; Kus 2012). The effect of these stressors is 
clear in light of recent top-income trends. High-earning hedge fund managers 
now routinely earn over a billion dollars per year (the top 50 of whom are all 
male), and a recent Forbes report (2012) shows that CEO earnings have been 
rising since 2010, hitting an average of $10.5 million in 2012 (including salary, 
bonuses and stock options).
The share of Ireland’s top 1 per cent began to move upward from the OECD 
average during the mid to late 1990s. At Ireland’s peak of 12.51 per cent in 
2006, Denmark recorded 5.91 per cent, the UK 14.82 per cent, and the US 18.06 
per cent. The behaviour of the Irish series appears curiously unresponsive to 
significant events however, despite a sharp fall and modest recovery following the 
financial crisis in 2008. Although its upward turn in the early 2000s corresponds 
to the most profitable phase of the finance-driven boom which preceded the 
crash, Brian Nolan (2007) has noted that the series appears markedly stable 
during periods such as the fiscal crisis of the 1980s. More significant still is the 
continued rise in the share of the top 1 per cent during a time when workers’ 
economy-wide share of national income was falling. This occurred as the 
amount of domestic credit issued by the banking sector rose from 39 per cent 
of GDP in 1980, to 207 per cent in 2008. As cheap credit stepped in to shore up 
stagnant wages and maintain consumption amongst workers, the absorption of 
financial capital in property yielded large returns to investors. Together, these 
trends suggest a strong capacity for high earners to weather macroeconomic 
turmoil with relative ease. 
The macroeconomic conditions governing labour’s falling share link closely 
with the rise in top incomes, and studies have already demonstrated the favourable 
impact of higher labour shares on other measures of the income distribution 
such as Gini coefficients (Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa 2007). Countries with 
stronger bargaining capacity (i.e. increasing labour shares), therefore tend to 
experience a reduction in economy-wide personal income inequality.
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Analysis of key drivers
A number of inequality drivers have been identified in the preceding discussion. 
As we have seen, income inequality assumes a number of primary forms, and 
as the volume of publicly available data has grown, and the scope of national 
surveys expanded over the last century, so too has the level of detail and insight 
we can extract on a given social problem. The following table presents a set of 
time series regressions of the impact of trade (globalisation) and financial sector 
profitability (financialisation) on top-income shares since 1970. The effects 
of variables identified in international literature and other time series studies 
as protections against rising inequality are also examined, namely welfare 
spending as a percentage of GDP, and the proportion of wage and salary earners 
in unions. Although the current sectoral coverage of unionisation is narrow, the 
series covers a time when union densities were at a recorded high of 64 per 
cent. This measure thus gives some insight into the net effect of the weakening 
of organised labour across the last three decades. Owing to shortcomings in 
available data, the effect of financialisation is estimated from 1995–2009. 
Models follow a standard error-correction specification, and complete models 
of the impact of these variables on labour’s share of GNI along with complete 
diagnostics may be found in Flaherty and Ó  Riain 2013. Dependent variables 
are in first differences (∆), and all predictors are entered both in first differences, 
and lagged by a period of one year (ßt-1). These models give a rough indication 
of their impact on both short and long-run trends over the series. For supporting 
illustration, a correlation matrix is provided with the income share of the top 1 
per cent entered in levels, and all others in lags of one year.
Although many of the variables in Table 1 are discussed in terms of their 
impact on labour’s share in Flaherty and Ó Riain (2013), the direction of their 
effect on top-income shares is mirrored in the above analysis. Globalisation is 
closely implicated in what Alderson and Nielsen (2002) have termed the ‘great 
U-turn’, and their analysis shows that factors of globalisation such as foreign 
investment and southern import volume have had a significant, positive effect 
on longitudinal inequality within countries. Similar effects are often found in 
studies of labour’s share, where direct investment induces downward wage 
competition between incumbent firms, and contributes to growth in the service 
economy, both of which have tended to erode labour’s bargaining position. 
Similar tendencies have defined the Irish experience of globalisation, with trade 
tending to inflate the share of the top 1 per cent. 
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Stressors
Dependent t–1     -.18*  -.51  -.58*  -.95
∆ Trade    .64   .06
Trade t–1   1.96*   .60*
∆ Finance   .09   .25
Finance t–1   .06   .54
Adj R2    .103   .030   –   –
Protections
Dependent t–1    -.07  -.39*   -.21
∆ Welfare    -.27   -.31
Welfare t–1    -.13   -.26
∆ Union  -.10   -.20
Union t–1  -.07*  -1.12*
Adj R2    .103   .117   –   –
* p ≤ .05
Top 1% Trade Finance Welfare
Trade   .806***
Finance   .764**  -.486
Welfare  -.577**  -.319*   .272
Union  -.928***   -.767***   -.890***   .223
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001
Note: Top 1% entered in levels, all others in lags of 1 year
In their analysis of the rise of the American super-rich, Volscho and Kelly 
(2012) found that higher capital gains taxation rates, coupled with higher union 
membership and democratic congressional control tended to reduce the share 
of the top 1 per cent. Conversely, trade openness and stock market valuation 
Table 1: Drivers of top-income change in Ireland, 1975–2010
∆ Top 1% Share
           Regression coefficient      Standardised coefficient
Table 2: Pearson correlations (Ireland, 1975–2010)
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had a positive effect, where higher imports of labour-intensive goods tended to 
weaken bargaining power. The shareholder value movement – a core feature of 
financialisation – also shifted managerial compensation from fixed salaries to 
performance benchmarking and stock options, and according to Forbes (2012), 
core salary and bonuses now account for only one-third of CEO annual income. 
The financialisation of the Irish economy followed a somewhat different path, 
albeit one closely tied to the fortunes of foreign financial markets. With cuts in 
capital gains tax, and deregulation of the financial sector in the 1990s, capital 
increasingly favoured investment in property over technology. As the investment 
strategies of the core banking sector switched toward property, construction 
and pricing became detached from underlying supply and demand, leading to 
a disastrous property bubble (Ó Riain 2012, 2014). The uneven distribution 
of the rewards of such a financialised economy is reflected in Kus’s finding of 
a positive association between the income shares of the top 5 per cent, and a 
composite index of stock market valuation, bank profitability, and securitisation 
(2012: 492). 
Similar effects are found in the above models, with trade and financial sector 
profitability both exerting positive influence on top incomes. As for traditional 
promoters of redistribution, both welfare and unionisation appear to pull down 
the shares of the top 1 per cent in the long run, consistent with existing research 
on other countries. Ireland’s welfare intensity (spending as a percentage of 
GDP) is comparatively low, yet its status as a ‘small open economy’ suggests 
that strong welfare should be a central policy aim, given the instabilities globali-
sation supposedly induces in outward-focused economies. Proportional welfare 
spending fell sharply in the 1990s as GDP grew and the economy moved 
toward full employment. Similarly, government consumption’s share of GDP – 
Stockhammer’s (2012) measure of welfare state retrenchment – fell consistently 
from the early 1990s to the financial crisis. 
Post-crisis welfare reforms have been particularly punitive with cuts in 
welfare rates, greater restraints on young claimants, and a series of ‘workfare’ 
measures in the vein of corporate welfare. Similarly the capacities of unions 
to effect economy-wide redistribution since the 1970s have been limited by 
falling membership, and the concentration of agreements in specific sectors 
under social partnership. This contrasts with bargaining systems such as 
Denmark’s where centralised wage agreements enjoy broader sectoral coverage 
(Ebbinghaus, Gobel and Koos 2011). In light of the weight of cross- national 
evidence demonstrating the downward effect of these institutions on top 
incomes, and the comparatively weaker impact of these variables relative 
to financialisation and trade in the above models, it seems that any further 
weakening will merely enhance top-income growth. In light of the fact that both 
unionisation and welfare have been substantially weakened in their capacity to 
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effect national protection, serious discussion is needed about alternative ways 
to sustain equality. 
Controversies and conclusions
Debate continues regarding the relationship between inequality and population 
well-being. Some have challenged Piketty’s findings on the basis of data 
inaccuracies (Giles 2014), although his published response indicates that 
proposed adjustments do little to alter fundamental underlying trends (Piketty 
2014b). Contrary evidence to Wilkinson and Pickett’s thesis detailed in The 
Spirit Level is also found in the work of Deaton (2001). Beckfield (2004) raises 
similar concerns regarding the within-country impact of inequality, noting that 
fixed-effects models tend to nullify the impact of inequality on health outcomes. 
More recent research from Kondo et al. (2009) shows a stronger association 
in random effects specifications which better capture the effect of between-
country inequalities. In short, the observed relationship appears to depend 
very much on model specifications, authors’ choice of country groupings, 
and selection of independent variables. This merely underscores the need for 
assessing individual countries more closely, in order to tease out the ways in 
which different combinations of social institutions may offset or enhance top-
income accumulation.
If Piketty has indeed put to rest Kuznet’s prediction of a secular return 
to equality as economic development weakens the income divide between 
industrial and agricultural workers, focus must shift to the institutional un-
derpinnings of inequality and its status as an inherent, rather than transient 
consequence of ‘functioning’ capitalism. If a return to compound growth is to 
remain a core policy agenda of states, then inequality and capital accumulation 
is a necessary precondition of renewed investment. Given the punitive turn 
in welfare provision since the crisis, and the sustained drive toward further 
retrenchment, it is clear that the existing institutions of the state cannot be relied 
upon to supply an appropriate income security foundation. The narrow coverage 
of existing (effectively bilateral) union pacts, coupled with stagnant membership 
rates suggests a task of mammoth reform in order to achieve similar levels of 
income equalisation enjoyed by the Nordics. Extensive casualisations of labour 
across both public and private sector have further eroded collective bargaining 
power, with the constant threat of redundancy and short-term contracting acting 
as an effective hedge against organisation. International comparison offers little 
encouragement, and the number of employees on zero-hours contracts has now 
reached 1.4 million in the UK, despite their better weathering of the crash, and 
comparatively lower unemployment rates (Inman and Monaghan 2014).
Recent figures published by the OECD (2014)3 offer further cause for 
concern. Irish market income inequality rose 5 per cent from 2007–11, and the 
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share of individuals with less than 50 per cent median income rose 8 percentage 
points during the same period. The OECD (2014) warns that this serves merely 
to undermine gains in equality achieved during times of strong growth. Calvert 
et al. (2013) note that in the early stages of the Celtic Tiger, economic growth 
benefited low-income groups by extending labour market participation. As 
the economy reached full employment in the 2000s, the effect of top-income 
growth took over, and these incomes were hit harder in the early years of the 
crisis leading to a temporary reduction in overall inequality (Calvert et al. 
2013: 29). The last recorded observations for Ireland in the World Top Incomes 
Database shows the top 1 per cent share at 10.48 per cent in 2008, and 10.5 per 
cent in 2009. Furthermore, Labour’s share has levelled off at 64 per cent since 
2010, following an upsurge in the pre-crisis years driven by growth in labour- 
intensive construction, and further ‘growth’ following the collapse of Ireland’s 
GDP during the financial crisis. These figures inspire little confidence in any 
real transfer of power to labour, and the weight of international evidence on 
both the trend decline and institutional drivers of labour’s share, is substantial.
The future of top earners thus appears secure; unscathed by an austerity 
programme that has leaned heavily on regressive fixed charges and a transfer 
of public wealth into private hands, the fortunes of the wealthiest look set to 
continue relatively undisturbed.
Data sources
Labour share: compensation of employees and nominal compensation of self-
employed divided by gross national income (source: European Commission 
AMECO database). 
Top 1 per cent: share in total national income of the top 1 per cent of earners 
(source: World Top Incomes Database; Nolan 2007). 
Trade: percentage global share of combined imports and exports (source: 
European Commission AMECO database). 
Finance: financial sector (FIRE) gross operating surplus as percentage of all 
sectors (source: OECD structural analysis database). 
Welfare: welfare spending as percentage of gross domestic product (source: 
European Commission AMECO database). 
Union: net union membership as proportion of wage and salary earners in 
employment (source: Visser 2011).
Notes
1 The recent upswing in labour’s share since the financial crisis is attributable to the 
post-crisis collapse in national income (GDP), a situation borne out by its post-2010 
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drop and levelling as unemployment grew. Full commentary on the nuances of this 
series and an extended analysis are available in Flaherty and Ó Riain 2013.
2 The negative impact of globalisation and international trade on labour’s share has 
been studied by Decreuse and Maarek (2008), Diwan (2001), and Harrison (2005), 
who have shown that the ability of multinationals to relocate with ease has tended 
to undermine the capacity of unions to negotiate terms of tenure and pay. Harrison’s 
(2005) results show particularly strong effects in poor countries where trade shares, 
foreign investment, and capital controls tend to weaken labour’s share.
3 Direct link to data: www.oecd.org/els/soc/OECD2014-Inequality-Update-Figures.
xlsx.
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